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Meat-Packer Conduct in Fed Cattle Pricing:
Multiple-Market Oligopsony  Power
Stephen  R. Koontz  and Philip Garcia
The exercise of market power across  multiple geographic  fed cattle markets  is mea-
sured with an econometric  model  which links behavior of the margin between boxed
beef and  regional  fed  cattle  prices  to  an oligopsony  model of multiple-market con-
duct.  The  game  theoretic  economic  model  suggests  that  for  market  power  to  be
exercised in a single market a discontinuous  pricing  strategy must be followed. Total
market  power  is  enhanced  if meat-packers  coordinate  this  pricing  strategy  across
geographic  markets.  Tests reject independence  of pricing conduct across  geographic
markets  which suggests  multiple-market  market power is  present. The extent  of the
market  power  also  is  consistent  with the  economic  model.  More  market  power  is
exercised across  regions  with the same meat-packing  firms.  However, the magnitude
of the market  power is  small  and decreased  between  the early and late  1980s.
Key words:  meat-packer  multiple-market conduct, noncooperative  game theory, ol-
igopsony power
Introduction
Producers,  policymakers,  and  regulatory  agencies  are  concerned  about  the  exercise  of
market power in geographically  dispersed commodity markets (U.S. General Accounting
Office). Recently,  markets for cattle, beef, hogs, and pork have been the focus of research
[U.S.  Department of Agriculture  (USDA) February  1996]  and public  attention.  Applied
research in this area has used various procedures  to make inferences  about market power
(Azzam  and  Anderson).  The  research  which  has  examined  market  power  across  geo-
graphic areas implicitly assumes  the boundaries  of regional  markets,  or has attempted to
identify the boundaries  and  draw market power inferences from the extent of price link-
ages across  regional  markets.
The classical  approach to  identifying regional  markets  involves estimating cross-mar-
ket elasticities;  inelastic  responses identify boundaries  and  isolated markets  (Stigler and
Sherwin). In a few cases, regional  quantity movements  have been used to identify market
boundaries  [Elzinga  and  Hogarty;  Hayenga,  Koontz,  and  Schroeder  (Part  2)].  As  an
alternative  to  measuring  market  boundaries,  Scheffman  and  Spiller  delineate  antitrust
markets  which  are  consistent  with  the  exercise  of market  power  within Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines. 1 Residual  own-price  elasticities  are used to identify  antitrust
markets,  which  may or may not differ from the underlying economic  market.  However,
the  use of these  procedures  is limited by  the  availability  and proprietary  nature  of the
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quantity data needed to examine product shipments or estimate elasticity models. Further,
the  Scheffman  and Spiller approach is contingent  on policy guidelines which  are subject
to  change.
As  a result,  applied  economists  often  resort  to  examining  regional  price  dynamics.
The methods used  vary from  correlations  to vector  autoregression  and  error  correction
models  (Goodwin  and  Schroeder  1990,  1991;  Hayenga  and  O'Brien;  Koontz,  Garcia,
and  Hudson  1990;  Schroeder  and  Goodwin;  Slade;  Uri,  Howell,  and  Rifkin;  Uri  and
Rifkin).  However,  these  procedures  suffer  from  several  weaknesses  that  can  produce
misleading  conclusions  about market  boundaries  and  inappropriate  market power infer-
ences.  First,  it  is not  always clear  whether  correlated  or uncorrelated  price movements
between markets imply  a market boundary  because transaction  costs have been ignored.
Geographic marketplaces  which generally trade will have low correlations  during periods
when  price  differentials  are  less  than  transaction  costs  and  no  commodity  is  traded.
Similarly,  low correlations  can exist between markets which do trade when the flows are
not unidirectional.  Second, the comovement of prices in geographic  markets may be due
to general  supply and demand factors  influencing both markets.  Seasonal price variation,
from weather-related  seasonal production,  will result in  strong price correlations;  yet the
geographic  marketplaces  may be  separate  economic  markets.  The  problem  with  these
price dynamics  studies  is that these  empirical models are not derived  explicitly from an
economic  model  of oligopoly  or  oligopsony  behavior  such that dynamic  relationships
can be interpreted in the  context of market power.
This article presents  direct measures  and a test of the competitiveness  of meat-packer
pricing conduct  across multiple  geographic  fed cattle  markets.  Like the  Scheffman  and
Spiller approach,  we measure  conduct  directly related  to  the exercise  of market  power.
Measuring  the  exercise  of market  power  across multiple  geographic  fed  cattle  markets
has not been done previously.  The information  should contribute to the body of knowl-
edge  about  meat-packer  conduct,  which  is  being  used  in  current  policy  discussions
(USDA  June  1996).  Second,  the  model  can  identify  markets  with  interactive  pricing
strategies,  permitting  an  innovative  procedure  for defining  market  boundaries.  Unlike
price  dynamics  studies,  this measure  is  not  affected  by  the  ignored  transaction  costs.
Further, the empirical models are derived from an economic model of oligopsony pricing
conduct.
Single-Market  Model
This  section  summarizes  the  single-market  model  of oligopsony  power  from  Koontz,
Garcia,  and  Hudson  (1993).  The  model  is  generalized  to  multiple  markets  in the  next
section.  The economic model is a noncooperative  game of fed cattle purchases by meat-
packers.  Meat-packers  cannot  form  enforceable  agreements,  so  if market  power  is  ex-
ercised,  it must be done through  self-enforcing  tacit agreements.
A meat-packer  produces  meat (y) from fed cattle  (x)  and  other inputs  (v).  Fixed pro-
portion production is assumed. The proportion of animal converted to meat is  1/k. Profits
of the  ith meat-packer  are
(1).  Tr(pi, p,.  z)  = (r, - ptk)  y(pi,  p,-,  Xt, ,)  - ci(z),
where pi is the  cattle price  paid by  the  ith firm, p~i is a vector  of cattle  prices paid by
88  July 1997Meat-Packer Conduct in Fed Cattle Pricing  89
all other firms,  r is the carcass beef price, and z is  a vector of other input prices. Profits
equal  the  margin  multiplied  by  volume,  less  other input  costs.  The  volume  of cattle
processed is influenced by the price the ith firm offers for cattle, prices offered by other
meat-packers,  exogenous  variables X,  and random variations  4.
In the repeated  game, the value function of the  ith meat-packer  is the sum of current
and  discounted expected  future profits:
(2)  Vi(s)  =  E  tit(s, s)  i  = 1,..., n  and  0 <5 < 1,
where profits depend on that firm's pricing strategy st and strategies st- i of all other firms,
and  8 is the discount rate.  Nash equilibrium is the  only reasonable  equilibrium concept
for a noncooperative  game  with simultaneous  decisions  (Friedman).
In  a single-period  game, the Nash strategy is  for all players  to price so that marginal
costs equal marginal  revenues  (Friedman). If the cattle price offered  (i.e., marginal cost)
is  less than marginal revenue  from meat sold, there is an incentive for each meat-packer
to offer a higher price,  secure a larger market  share of the cattle procured, and sell more
meat. However,  when  all meat-packers  respond to this incentive, cattle prices are bid up
to marginal  revenue  and there is no market power exercised.
In a multiple-period game, Nash equilibrium can support strategies where market pow-
er  is  exercised.  As  in  the  single-period  game,  individual  firms  have  an  incentive  to
improve  profits  by  increasing  cattle  price  offers.  However,  a  punishment  strategy  can
deter cheating  on the tacit agreement.  In a punishment strategy,  all firms price at coop-
erative  level p'  if,  in  the  ashe  last  period,  all  other  firms  priced  at  the  cooperative  level.
However,  if one  firm prices  at p* > p', then all  firms revert  to  Nash behavior p". For
collusive  pricing  to  be  a Nash equilibrium  strategy,  returns  from cheating  followed  by
single-period  Nash behavior must be  less than the incentive to cooperate,  or
(3)  Vi(p')  >  7ri(p*)  +  WVI(p")  for all firms.
Equation  (3)  is the  incentive constraint.
Green  and Porter generalize  this game.  The result is an equilibrium  punishment strat-
egy that is more forgiving.  They relax the assumption  of perfect information where each
firm  observes  the  actions  of other  firms.  Collusive  equilibria  remain  possible but  the
punishment  strategy is modified.  Because  noncooperative  behavior  can occur from ran-
dom price variations,  the strategy must be more forgiving.  Meat-packers  maximize value
function  (2)  subject to  a threshold  strategy:
(4)  s  =  p,  if  < m,_
t  yp"  if A  >I  mt,_  in the last T - 1 periods,
where  ju is a threshold margin, p'  and p" are cooperative  and noncooperative  prices,  and
m,_t  is the margin between  carcass beef price and  an observable  cattle price during  the
previous  period.  If the margin  in the  previous  period is greater  than threshold  4, firms
offer the  cooperative  price p'. However,  if the margin  in the  previous  T-1 periods  is
less  than  the  threshold,  firms  offer  the  noncooperative  price p".  Like  the  punishment
strategy, cooperation is enforced through threat of temporary high prices and low profits.
Substituting  the threshold strategy  (4) into the value  function  (2) yields the recursive
equation  summarizing  the multiple-period  optimization  problem.  For  a firm  initially in
the cooperative  phase,  the value function  is
Koontz and GarciaJournal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
(5)  V,(p')  =  Tri(p')  +  Prob{/j  < m,}8V/(p')  +  Prob{ti  - m,}L  =  6  i(p " )  + TV/(p ' ) .
The incentive  constraint  for the threshold  strategy  is
T-1
(6)  Vi(p')  >  ri(p*)  +  E  8tXri(p")  +  Vi(p'),
t=l
where p*  > p'  is the price  paid by the  cheating  firm.  Collusive  profits  are greater than
the one-period  gain from cheating plus  T-  1 periods of Nash profits.  The incentive  con-
straint must hold for threshold pricing  to be an equilibrium strategy and for market power
to be exercised.
If threshold  pricing  is  an equilibrium  strategy,  players  do  not  willingly  cheat on the
tacit  agreement.  However,  random  price  variations  will  cause  margins  to  periodically
cross the threshold.  For the strategy to be credible, the players must then revert to pricing
at  single-period  Nash  levels.  Players  also  may  revert  to Nash  pricing  when they tacitly
renegotiate  the level of market power exercised  in  the strategy.2 Oligopsony behavior is
not  on the continuum  between  perfect  competition  and monopsony.  Rather,  actions  are
discontinuous:  Nash  during noncooperative  phases  and bounded  away  from monopsony
solutions during cooperative phases  (Porter 1983a).  This implies a discontinuous pattern
in meat-packer  margins  will be observed if threshold pricing  is followed.
Multiple-Market Model
Punishment  strategies  have  been used to  study multiple-market  conduct  (Bernheim  and
Whinston;  Gelfand and  Spiller).3 The underlying  idea is that  firms in  an industry  often
encounter  each other in multiple markets.  Rather than treat each market separately,  firms
can treat conduct  of other firms  in all relevant markets,  as  a single  type of conduct.
The  optimization  problem  of the  firm in  a multiple-market  setting  is  similar  to  the
single-market  problem.  Firms  maximize  the  expected  value  of the  sum  of discounted
future profits  across  K markets:
K  0o  K
(7)  Vi(st)  =  V(s=  E  E  'tik(s, St
i ,
k=  Lt=0  k=l
where si and St i denote strategies across the K relevant markets; through choice of thresh-
old margin,
8'  ip" if  t, 2 mt,_  in  any of the K markets for the last T -1  periods,
2 The game theoretic  model has  strong  heuristic appeal.  The model suggests  that  meat-packers  bid aggressively  for cattle
when  other meat-packers  are bidding  aggressively  and  do  not bid aggressively  when  others  are not.  Meat-packers  are bal-
ancing two incentives.  They  have the incentive  to bid low prices for cattle.  Doing so results  in greater per unit profits. They
also have the incentive to  bid cattle  away from other  meat-packers.  If successful,  this results  in greater total profits. The  two
incentives  are in conflict,  but given the small number of meat-packers in regional fed cattle markets, both of these behavioral
regimes should be  observed  in price.
3  Schroeter and Azzam  also examine  multiple-market conduct  by meat-packers,  but the conduct  does not emerge through
a punishment  strategy.
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where /u is a vector of threshold margins  and m,_i is the vector of margins of the previous
period.  The inequality  is violated  if any  of the vector elements  violate  the inequality.  If
any  firm fails  to conform  to the  collusive agreement,  all  firms revert  to noncooperative
behavior in  all K markets.
The value function  of a firm in multiple markets  is
K  K
(9)  Vi(p)  =  Vik()  ik()  + Prob{ /  <  m,}SVik(p')
k=l  k=l
T-kI
+  Prob {Iu  m,}  j  S r7Tk(p)  +  Vik(p  )  .
The incentive  constraint for the  threshold  strategy  is pooled across  markets:
K  K  T-  1
(10)  Vik(pi)> E  'i(p  *)  +  8  Vi(  y  )
k=l  k=l  t=l
The constraint must  hold for multiple-market  pricing to  be an  equilibrium strategy  and
for market  power to be  exercised across  multiple markets.
The  pooled  incentive  constraint  is  the  key  to  exercising  market  power  in  multiple
markets.  Multiple-market  contact cannot reduce  the ability of firms to collude.  Firms can
always  treat  each  market  in  isolation.  The  pooling  can  only  relax  binding  incentive
constraints  in individual  markets,  increase the  set of equilibrium  strategies,  and increase
collusive profits. However,  if benefits  and costs of collusion increase proportionally  they
will  offset  each  other.  Bernheim  and  Whinston  show  that  the benefits  of collusion  are
greater than  costs  in  spatial markets  when firms  have increasing  returns  to scale.  These
conditions  describe  the  fed  cattle  market  and  meat-packing  firms  (Connor).  The  threat
of severe punishments  supports  very collusive  profits in the cooperative  periods.  How-
ever,  there  are  limits.  The  more  markets  that  are  considered,  the  more  costly  it  is  for
firms to coordinate  pricing.  With more markets  and players, the  collusive equilibrium is
less likely to be  supported because  tacit communication  and  trust between players must
increase.  Thus, identifying  the  set of relevant markets  where  multiple-market  pricing  is
coordinated is  a statistical exercise.
Because the  model relies  on measures  of conduct,  transaction  costs  are  included im-
plicitly. If the  costs of coordinating  multiple-market  conduct  are excessive,  the exercise
of market power across multiple markets will not occur.  This is an advantage over studies
which  have  examined  price  dynamics.  Likewise,  if the  transaction  costs  of tacitly  de-
veloping  and monitoring  a  cooperative  pricing  strategy  are too large  for firms  within a
single  market,  the exercise  of market power will not occur within individual markets.
The single-market model implies that the exercise of market power in individual mar-
kets results  in  a discontinuous  pattern in  prices.  The multiple-market  model implies the
exercise  of market  power  across  geographic  markets  results  in discontinuous  patterns
being coordinated across relevant markets.  There should be high correlation  in the move-
ment of the  markets  between  the  cooperative  and  noncooperative  phases.  Finding  this
correlation  implies  cooperation  between  players  across  markets  and  identifies  relevant
markets.  This  is the  statistical  exercise.  The extent of the cooperation  can be  measured
by the strength of the  correlation.
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Methods
The  econometric  model  for  a  single  market  is  summarized  in  the  beginning  of  this
section.  The single-market model provides  information about when each individual mar-
ket is in the cooperative  or noncooperative  phase.  The comovement  of this probability
of cooperation  across  models for various  geographic  markets  is measured  to  assess the
coordination  of market  power.  The  multiple-market  measures  of market  power  end the
section.
The econometric  model is derived from the first-order condition of a profit maximizing
firm. Maximizing  (1) through  choice of price results  in
(11)  arTi/api =  (r - pik)  +  yyi  /  (  p 1 yi/pj)(p/pi)  - kyi  = 0,
where pj denotes the price offered by the jth firm, j7i.  The change in procurement given
a change  in cattle price is  a structural parameter:
(12)  ayi/lpi =  y  and  yi/ap  =  -yl(n  - 1)  wherej  j  i  and  j  =  1,  ... ,  n.
The  conjecture  is zero  in noncooperative  periods  and is positive in cooperative  periods:
13)  [l(n-)  (p  > 0  during the cooperative  phase (13)  [1/(n -1)]  g  (ap/api) =  fi =  -p 8joi t  '  0  during the noncooperative  phase.
The  conjecture  measures  the  average  change  in  cattle  price  offered  by  other  firms  as
meat-packers  switch between  phases.4
Because  only regional  price data are available,  the  first-order condition  is aggregated
over  n firms,  yielding  an  expression  in market  variables:  p, is  average  regional  cattle
price,  30o  measures  the  average  conjecture  across  firms  (Bresnahan),  and  the margin  (r,
- pk/)  is denoted as  m,. Also, because only price data are available,  aggregate  quantities
(y,)  are captured through
(14)  Yt  = X,  + t,
where  X, is  the  tth row  of an  exogenous  variable  matrix,  qr  are  parameters,  and  a  an
error term.  Exogenous  variables  include  feeder  cattle  prices,  corn  prices,  interest rates,
and temporal  dummy variables.  Daily  regional  fed cattle  supply is not  assumed to be  a
function  of fed cattle price.  Rather,  prices  divide the given  number of animals  between
meat-packers.
Substituting equations  (12),  (13),  and (14)  into (11) yields an equation  where margins
are modeled  as  a function  of variations  in supply and  the  state of cooperation between
meat-packers.  The cooperative/noncooperative  behavior is represented by a proportional
increase in mean  and variance  of the margin:
()  FXa +  el,  if mt is cooperative
(15)  mt,  X,aXtc  +  2t,  if m, is noncooperative,
4 Pricing  strategies  are  restricted  to be  strategic  complements,  as opposed  to allowing  the  empirical model  to determine
whether  the strategies  are complements  or  substitutes.  (See Bulow,  Geanakoplos,  and Klemperer; Tirole.)
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where  E2t  =  4elt. Assuming  e1,  - N(0,r 2),  results  in  E62  ~  N(0,4,o2).  The  average  con-
jecture is identified,  /0  = (1  - 0),  and a is a vector of reduced-form parameters.
If the  sequence  of  regime  changes  were  known,  an  indicator  function  could  be
defined as:
^16  1  _O  af  if mt is in the cooperative  regime
t o=  if mt is in the noncooperative  regime,
and estimation of a switching regression would be conditioned on the regime. The density
for observation  m,  given the data and  I, is
(17)  h(mlXt, I,)  =  It/(oaV  ) exp{-(m,  - Xta)2/2o 2}
+  (1  - I,)/lfaV2,  exp{-(m,-  Xta)2/22ar2},
and parameter estimation is straightforward.  Since the sequence of changes is not known,
a process to classify each observation must be specified. A Bernoulli process is used and
has been used in all previous  applications  (e.g., Porter 1983b).5 With a Bernoulli process,
the cooperative  and  noncooperative  phases occur with probabilities  A and (1-A).
The density for observation m, is
(18)  h(m IX,)  =  A/(rV27r) exp{-(mt  - Xa)2/2 2}
+  (1  - )/4lfoX\  exp{-(mt-  Xta)2/20202}.
The log-likelihood  function satisfies regularity  conditions for consistency  and asymptotic
normality  of maximum likelihood estimates,  denoted  0*  =  (a* (r*  4b*  A*).
The switching regression  can be used to measure the probability  that each observation
is in the cooperative  regime.  Following  Kiefer,  the  series of probabilities  are calculated
using Bayes rule:
(19)  t*  =  A*h(mt Xt,  a*, a*, It =  1)
A*h(mtlX,,  a*, a*, I, =  1)  +  (1  - A*)h(mlXt,  a*,  A*,  a*,  I,  = 0)
The  xo*  are estimates  of I,. From Lee  and Porter,
(20)  1* =  1 if wt  1/2
The  ft*  and  Pt  series  provide  complementary  information  about  conduct  in multiple
markets.  The  comovement  in  *l across  geographic  markets  provide  direct  information
about  parallel  changes  in the  state  of cooperation  and  the  exercise  of multiple-market
market  power.  The I*  series  are  estimates  of the  actual  state  of cooperation.  The  Cw*
variables  provide  similar information in a different random  variable.  The comovements
in  w*  across  markets  provide  information  about parallel  changes  in the  probability  of
cooperation.  The  probabilities  tell  about  the  pricing  environment.  The  densities  of the
two random  variables  suggest different methods  of analysis.
Contingency  tables are used to test the pairwise  independence of the I*  series.  A 2X2
5The economic  model  suggests  a T-Markov  process.  However,  estimating a T-Markov  switching  regression  is infeasible
(Green  and Porter).  While  the T-Markov  is useful to derive analytical  results  for the economic  model,  its use  in estimation
would fix the noncooperative period length.  In practice,  the length of these periods may be flexible;  actions within the strategy
may vary  (Porter  1985).  Also,  variations  on  collusive  strategies  may  not be  T-Markov  (Abreu,  Pearce,  and Stachetti). The
Bernoulli process  is  flexible  enough  to approximate  a T-Markov process  and may be robust to alternative  processes.
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Table  1.  Contingency  Table  Structure
I,2t
Nonco-
I*  Cooperative  operative  Total
Cooperative  Pc  Pcn  Pc+
Noncooperative  Pnc  Pnn  Pn+
Total  P+c  P+n
table is presented  in table  1. The subscripts  1 and 2  denote different markets and Pi  are
probabilities.  In the absence of multiple-market  market power, movements of the different
I*,  series between  cooperative  and  noncooperative  regimes  should be independent.  The
null hypothesis  is
(21)  Ho: pj = pi+'p+j  for  i =  c, n  and  j  =  c,  n.
If the pricing conduct within two markets  is independent,  the probability  that both mar-
kets  are in the cooperative  state (p,,)  is equivalent  to the probability  that market  1 is in
the cooperative  state (pc+) multiplied by the probability that market 2 is in the cooperative
state  (p+c).  Rejecting  the  null hypothesis  for  one  combination  implies rejection  of the
hypothesis for all combinations.  Strength of the multiple-market  cooperation is measured
by the probability  that  both markets  are in the cooperative  state (pc).
The probabilities  that pairs of markets  are in the cooperative  state are  summarized in
a regression  model.  The probability  of cooperation is modeled  as  a function of regional
market characteristics,  some  implied by the  economic  model.  The market  characteristic
variables  are  distance  between  the two  regions,  total number  of meat-packing  firms  in
both regions, number of meat-packing  firms which are common to both regions,  average
volume of cattle slaughtered in the two regions, average  four-firm concentration ratio for
the  two regions,  and  a  dummy variable  for whether  or not  either market  is  a terminal
market.  The markets  are classified  into one of three  regions  and  a  same-region  dummy
variable  is  also included.  The three  regions  are the Upper Midwest,  Central  Plains,  and
Southern  Plains.6 Firm number and composition explanatory variables are similar to those
used by Porter (1985).  The greater the number of meat-packing  firms, the less likely tacit
collusion  will  be  an  equilibrium  pricing  strategy.  However,  the  greater  the number  of
firms  which are common between  two regions,  the more likely  an collusive equilibrium
strategy  exists. Further,  the greater the  distance between  two regions,  the less likely  the
meat-packers  in each region  can treat the  two regions  as  one market.  The same-region
dummy  variable  is  an  alternative  measure  of distance  between  markets.  Traditional  in-
dustrial  organization  theory  suggests  the  four-firm  concentration  ratio  should be posi-
tively  related  to  exercise  of  market  power.  Our  model  suggests  the  same  hypothesis.
However,  the  composition  of the firms  is more  important.  The potential  effect of a ter-
minal market and market volume on the probability  of cooperation is not known a priori.
6 Illinois,  Iowa, Eastern  Nebraska,  and  the terminal  markets  are  classified  in the  Upper  Midwest  region.  Colorado  and
Western Nebraska are in the Central Plains region, and Eastern Kansas,  Western  Kansas, and Texas  are in the Southern Plains
region.
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Information  from  Granger  causality  tests  are  used  to measure  the pairwise  dynamic
interactions  of the  probabilities  that  the  kth  market  is  in  the  cooperative  regime,  the
Jt,  series. The variables  wt, and  At*  are rewritten  as xt  and y,. All  series are  stationary
or exhibit a  deterministic  trend.  Standard  Granger-type  models  are used as  follows:
p  q




(23)  y,  =  o  +  liYt-i  +  2jXt-  +  U2t  var(u2t)  =  2,
i=1  j=l1
where the trend is omitted for simplicity. Akaike's Information Criterion is used to choose
lag  lengths for each variable.  F-statistics  are used to test the  significance  of past values
of the probability  of cooperation  in various  other markets  on the  current  probability  of
cooperation  of each individual market.
Autoregressive  models  using  only  lagged values  of the  dependent  variables  also  are
estimated.  Let the error  variances  of the  autoregressive  models  for x, and yt be  denoted
inp  and  P2.  Geweke  defines  measures  of the linear association  between two variables  as:
(24)  Pxy  =  ln(pol/O,)  and  Pyx  =  ln(p2/a2).
These statistics measure  the strength of the linear causality  from x to y and  from y to x.
In the  case  of feedback,  where  causality occurs  in both directions, the  measures  can be
used to  determine  which causal relationship  is largest.  Symmetry  is tested  with the fol-
lowing  statistic:
(25)  Px<y = [N'Px,  - 1/3]  - [N.Py,,  - 1/3]12,
where N  is the  number of observations.  The statistic  approximates  a normal(0,2)  under
the null hypothesis  of symmetric  feedback (Geweke).
In the following analysis, causality results  are reported between pairs of markets using
small  sample  F-tests,  and  where  feedback  occurs,  the  test  of symmetry  is  reported  to
identify any dominant market.  The test results will reveal which regional  fed cattle mar-
kets  lead multiple-market  pricing  conduct.
Results
The  daily  fed  cattle  price  data  are  from  eight direct  trade  regions  defined by  the  U.S.
Department  of Agriculture,  Agricultural  Marketing  Service,  and  two  terminal  markets.
The direct markets are Illinois, Iowa and Southern Minnesota, Eastern Nebraska, Eastern
Kansas, Western Kansas, Colorado, the region including Western Nebraska, Southwestern
South Dakota  and Wyoming,  and the region including  the Texas and Oklahoma panhan-
dles  and  Northeastern  New  Mexico.  The  terminal  markets  are  Omaha,  Nebraska,  and
Sioux  City, Iowa.  A majority  of total U.S.  fed cattle  sales  occur in these  eight regions.
The USDA daily boxed beef cutout value  series for choice 550-700  pound carcasses  is
the  carcass beef price used to  calculate the margin  series.
A potential difficulty with this model is that the inference about market power requires
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics  of the Probability That Each Regional  Market Is in the
Cooperative  Phase
No.  %  %
Obs.  Mean  SD  Minimum  Maximum  Coop  Noncoop
First Perioda
Illinois  608  0.4690  0.1802  0.2162  0.9995  0.2928  0.7072
Iowa  608  0.4337  0.1815  0.1693  0.9993  0.2303  0.7697
Eastern Nebraska  608  0.5776  0.1819  0.3208  0.9999  0.4967  0.5033
Western Nebraska  608  0.2705  0.2249  0.0608  0.9999  0.1349  0.8651
Eastern  Kansas  608  0.2989  0.1926  0.1192  0.9987  0.1250  0.8750
Western  Kansas  608  0.1978  0.1971  0.0436  1.0000  0.0806  0.9194
Colorado  608  0.0945  0.1537  0.0099  0.9999  0.0362  0.9638
Texas  608  0.2587  0.1884  0.0746  0.9955  0.0970  0.9030
Omaha, NE  608  0.2948  0.1804  0.1316  0.9889  0.1168  0.8832
Sioux City, IA  608  0.3614  0.2131  0.1127  0.9996  0.1826  0.8174
Second Periodb
Illinois  526  0.0237  0.0627  0.0045  0.9607  0.0038  0.9962
Iowa  526  0.0643  0.0956  0.0252  0.9762  0.0114  0.9886
Eastern  Nebraska  526  0.0593  0.0964  0.0207  0.9800  0.0114  0.9886
Western Nebraska  526  0.0465  0.1211  0.0043  0.9995  0.0152  0.9848
Eastern  Kansas  526  0.1670  0.1910  0.0049  1.0000  0.0608  0.9392
Western  Kansas  526  0.1039  0.1439  0.0059  1.0000  0.0304  0.9696
Colorado  526  0.1470  0.1075  0.0529  0.9473  0.0209  0.9791
Texas  526  0.2243  0.1429  0.1174  0.9974  0.0513  0.9487
Omaha,  NE  526  0.1782  0.1721  0.0376  0.9985  0.0589  0.9411
Sioux City,  IA  526  0.4050  0.2397  0.1259  1.0000  0.2338  0.7662
a The first period is  from May  1980 to September  1982.
b The second period is  from July  1984 to July 1986.
identifying  a component in the  margin equation error term.  The difficulty  is that shocks
other than changes  in conduct may influence margin levels. Thus, it is important to apply
this model to data from time periods that are structurally stable in terms of the underlying
industry cost and  supply functions  (Green and Porter).  Examining  the industry structure
between  1980  and  1993  reveals  two  periods  of relative  stability:  May  1980  through
September  1982  and July  1984 through July  1986  (Ward  1988; Meat Industry Magazine;
Koontz).  These  two  periods  are  used  in the  analysis.  Further,  variation  in  supply  is  a
major factor  which  may lead to changes  in  margins.  In response to this concern,  corre-
lations  between  the  measures  of conduct,  that  is,  the  probabilities  of cooperation,  and
supply variables were  examined.  Correlations  were examined  between the  probabilities
and temporal dummy variables  and between aggregated  probabilities  and cattle numbers
from the monthly USDA Cattle on Feed report. The probabilities  are not correlated with
supply variables.
Koontz,  Garcia,  and Hudson (1993)  presented  results of the  single-market models.  In
summary,  market power persisted in all regional  fed cattle markets.  However, the extent
was relatively  small in dollar per animal  losses and less market power  was exercised  in
the second period. Summary  statistics of the probability of cooperation  (wo*)  and the state
of cooperation  (I*)  series are presented  in table 2. The means,  standard deviations,  min-
imums,  and maximums  are of the to*  series.  The last two  columns report the percentage
of time that each market is in the cooperative (/t = 1) and noncooperative  (I* =0) regimes.
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Table 3.  Probability That the Market on the Vertical Axis  Is in the Cooperative
Phase Given the Market on the Horizontal Axis  Is in the Cooperative  Phase during
the Same  or Previous Four Business  Days
Market  IA  E. NE  W. NE  E. KS  W. KS  CO  TX  Omaha  Sioux
Illinois  0.6250a  0.7928  0.4605  0.3931  0.2993  0.1563  0.3618  0.3947  0.5674
0.0114  0.0095  0.0114  0.0114  0.0114  0.0  0.0114  0.0114  0.0114
Iowa  0.6760  0.4227  0.3799  0.2780  0.1513  0.3306  0.3586  0.5016
0.0304  0.0285  0.0494  0.0494  0.0190  0.0342  0.0494  0.0494
Eastern Nebraska  0.4934  0.4276  0.3273  0.1612  0.3849  0.4145  0.6053
0.0342  0.0551  0.0399  0.0190  0.0418  0.0494  0.0570
Western  Nebraska  0.3438  0.2368  0.1414  0.2911  0.3207  0.4342
0.0551  0.0475  0.0171  0.0380  0.0532  0.0646
Eastern  Kansas  0.2615  0.1398  0.2862  0.2664  0.3454
0.1046  0.0703  0.1141  0.1483  0.2471
Western  Kansas  0.1201  0.2368  0.2204  0.2714
0.0361  0.0951  0.1236  0.1426
Colorado  0.1414  0.1316  0.1414
0.0247  0.0760  0.0932
Texas  0.2484  0.3092
0.0989  0.2053
Omaha,  NE  0.3635
0.2414
a The top number refers to the first period, May  1980 to September  1982, and the bottom number refers
to the second period, July  1984 to  July 1986.
The results clearly  show more cooperation  in the first time period and  thus more market
power is being  exercised  in the individual  markets.
The probability  that  a pair of the geographic  markets are both in the cooperative  state
are presented  in table  3. Estimates  are aggregated.  The I*  series are aggregated over the
current and  previous  four business days.  This is  done assuming  players  in the  different
geographic  markets  need time  to  observe  and react  to  prices in  other markets.  Further,
fed cattle  markets  are for  the  most part  a  weekly  market  (Ward  1992).  That  is, meat-
packers  modify  pricing  decisions  weekly.  Results  show  the  linkages  between  pairs  of
markets  over  a week.  Independence  of markets  in movement  between  cooperative  and
noncooperative  regimes  is  rejected.  Fisher's  Exact  Test is  used  (Bickel  and  Doksum).
Most of the tests  are  significant  at the  1%  level  and  all are  significant at the  5%  level
with five exceptions. In the first period, independence is rejected at the 10%  level between
Eastern  Nebraska  and  Illinois,  and  between  Eastern  Nebraska  and  Colorado. 7 In  the
second  period,  independence  is not  rejected  between  Colorado  and  Texas  and between
Illinois  and  Sioux City.  Independence  cannot be tested between Illinois and Colorado in
the  second  sample  because  the markets  are never jointly  in the  cooperative  phase;  the
test breaks  down.  However, there  can be no multiple-market  behavior in this case.
Multiple-market  market power  is exercised across  geographic  fed cattle markets.  The
tests of independence  are rejected.  However,  as  with the single-market model results, the
extent of the market  power is small and  much lower in the  second time period.  Most of
7 Caution must be  used in interpreting  the  size of the joint probability.  Size should  not be  linked to significance.  Rather,
it is  the size  relative  to the  sizes of the  marginal probabilities;  see equation  (21).
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Table 4.  Regression  Model  Results Where the Probability That Various Market Pairs
Are  in the Cooperative  Phase Is Explained as a Function of Regional  Market
Characteristics
First Period Modela  Second  Period Model
b
Standard  Standard
Variable  Coefficient  Error  Coefficient  Error
Distance  -2.1283  2.8150  -0.2989  1.0190
Same-region  dummy  15.9620*c  8.3760  -1.1513  2.4520
Volume  0.00009  0.0024  0.5585  0.6995
Four-firm  concentration  ratio  -0.8623**  0.3693  0.1789  0.1798
Number of firms  -0.3533  1.9810  0.3879  0.7423
Number of common  firms  4.1297  2.9780  2.2909*  1.1490
Terminal market  dummy  -2.3670  12.7700  9.8064**  4.3490
Intercept  114.41  42.8800  -19.0310  18.9000
.........-----------------------------------------............................................................... 7-----------------------------------------------------------..........................
R2  39.98%  43.74%.
F-Statistic  2.5904  3.0235
p-Value  0.0210  0.0089
a The first period is from  May  1980 to  September  1982.
b The second period is from  July  1984  to July  1986.
c  Two  asterisks  and one  asterisk  denote significance  at the  5%  and  10%  levels, respectively.
the joint probabilities  are small.  The Illinois, Iowa, Eastern Nebraska,  Omaha, and Sioux
City markets interact the most closely.  The joint probabilities are largest between markets
in  the  Upper  Midwest  region.  The  multiple-market  interaction  of Colorado  with  other
geographic  markets is the  smallest. The remaining Western Plains  states  markets exhibit
intermediate levels  of market power.
Models  summarizing  the  probabilities  from  table  3  are  presented  in table  4.  In  the
model  of first period,  the  same-region  dummy  variable  is  significant  at the  6.5%  level
and the four-firm concentration ratio is significant at the 2.5%  level.8 If a pair of markets
are  in the  same  geographic  region  (i.e.,  Upper  Midwest,  Central Plains,  and  Southern
Plains),  the markets  exhibit a  16%  higher probability  of jointly being  in the cooperative
phase.  This result suggests market boundaries  are consistent with  this three-region clas-
sification.  A  10%  increase  in  the  average  four-firm  concentration  ratio  of two  regions
leads  to  an  8.9%  decline  in the  probability  that  the  pair  of markets  are jointly  in  the
cooperative  phase.  This  is opposite  of what  is  suggested  by traditional  industrial  orga-
nization theory but may reflect that the same firms  are not present in regions  with high
concentration  ratios. Further,  the meat-packing  industry experienced excess capacity  dur-
ing  the  entire  mid-to-late  1980s,  and  excess  capacity  was  likely  large  in regions  with
high concentration. Thus, pricing was the most competitive  in high concentration regions.
Variables  capturing the number of firms and the number of firms common to both regions
are  both  insignificant.  Although,  these  measures  are  correlated  with  the  same-region
dummy variable  and the  coefficients  do have  the  expected  sign. For  the second period,
the number  of common firms  variable  is  significant  at the  5.4%  level  and the  terminal
8 Because the dependent variable is not distributed normal, parameters  and standard errors  were calculated by bootstrapping
the residuals.
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Table  5.  Causal Flows  between  the Probabilities That Individual Markets Are in the
Cooperative Phase and Statistics for the Test of Symmetric Feedback,  May 1980 to
September  1982
E.  W.  E.  W.
Market  IA  NE  NE  KS  KS  CO  TX  Omaha  Sioux
Illinois  (  <-  (  - (
-1.787
Iowa  - <-  (  (  - (  -
0.102
E.  Nebraska  - >  '  <  - >  4  >
0.221  1.162  1.601  3.152**  1.90  1.344
W.  Nebraska  ->  <  - <  - ->  <->  * -
1.234  -0.214  -0.310  -0.107  2.416**
E.  Kansas  < - <  <  >  < - -
-0.257  1.351  -1.044
W.  Kansas  - --  --
Colorado>
Texas  <
Omaha,  NE  >
1.415
Note:  Two  asterisks  denote  the  statistic  is  significant  at  the  5%  level.  A  significant negative  statistic
denotes  asymmetric  feedback with the <- direction  being the largest and  a  significant positive statistic
denotes  asymmetric  feedback  with the -> direction  being the largest.
market  dummy  variable  is  significant  at the  3.1%  level.  If a pair  of markets  has  one
more  firm  in  common  than  another  pair  with  similar  characteristics,  then  the  markets
exhibit  a  2.3%  higher probability  of jointly being  in  the cooperative  phase.  This result
is consistent  with the economic  model,  albeit the magnitude of the effect is quite small.
If one of the two  markets in  a pair is a terminal market,  the pair is 9.8%  more  likely to
jointly be in the cooperative phase.  This last result suggests that the presence of terminal
markets,  an  alternative  marketing  institution,  does  not mitigate  the  exercise  of market
power or enhance  competition  in fed cattle markets.  In fact,  the opposite  may be occur-
ring due to  the thinness  of terminal  markets.
Tables  5  and  6 present  the results from the Granger  causality tests between  co*  series.
Arrows  denote  significant  causal  relationships.  The  statistic  reported  under  an  arrow
denoting  feedback is the test of symmetry.  The first period results are in table  5  and the
second period are in table 6. The results suggest there is considerable  interaction between
the  o* series  across  geographic  markets.  There is no one  market which  leads  multiple-
market  conduct.  However,  there  are  groups  of markets  which  lead,  there  are  markets
which  follow the  leading  markets,  and  there  are pairs of markets which  do not interact.
In the first period,  Illinois and Iowa are follower markets.  Colorado is a leader market,
but the extent of market power exercised between  Colorado  and other markets  is small.
There  is  considerable  feedback  between  Eastern  Nebraska,  Western  Nebraska,  Eastern
Kansas,  Western  Kansas,  Texas,  and the terminal  markets,  and much of the feedback  is
symmetric.  Only  the feedback  between Eastern  Nebraska and  Texas  is asymmetric  with
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Table 6.  Causal Flows  between  the Probabilities That Individual Markets Are in the
Cooperative  Phase and Statistics for the Test of Symmetric Feedback, July  1984 to
July 1986
Market  IA  E. NE  W.  NE  E. KS  W. KS  CO  TX  Omaha  Sioux
Illinois  - <<  ---  ---  (
Iowa  >  --  --
E.  Nebraska  <-  ,'-  - - ---
0.900  -0.992
W. Nebraska  <  - <-  ---  ---
-2.036*
E. Kansas  ---  - ---




Note:  One  asterisk  denotes  the statistic  is  significant  at the  10%  level.  A  significant negative  statistic
denotes  asymmetric  feedback with the <- direction  being the largest and  a  significant positive statistic
denotes  asymmetric  feedback  with the -> direction  being the  largest.
Eastern  Nebraska being the  leading  market.  There  are also a  few markets  which do not
interact.  Eastern  Kansas  and  Iowa,  Colorado  and Western  Kansas,  Western  Kansas and
the terminal markets have no significant causal relationships.  The results suggest conduct
in Nebraska and Kansas  lead conduct in other regional  markets during  the May  1980 to
September  1982 time period.  Further,  the  amount  of causality and  feedback  suggest the
extent of fed  cattle  market  boundaries  was large  during  this  time  period.  Causal  rela-
tionships and feedback are the largest between markets within the three regions. However,
causality  is present between  markets across  the  three regions.
In  the  second  period,  there  is  much  less  feedback.  Identifying  leader  and  follower
markets  is easier.  There  also are many more  cases  where markets  do not interact. Iowa,
Eastern Kansas,  and Western  Kansas are leader markets.  Although, Western Kansas does
not interact  with  several  markets.  Illinois,  Eastern  Nebraska,  and Western  Nebraska are
follower markets.  Colorado and the terminal markets  are both leaders and followers. The
probability  of cooperation in Texas does not interact with any markets with the exception
of the two  Kansas  markets.  Texas  is the most independent  market and  Western  Kansas
is the  second most  independent.  The results  suggest  conduct  in  Iowa and  Kansas  lead
conduct in other regional  markets during  the July  1984  to July  1986  time period.  How-
ever,  the  exercise  of multiple-market  market  power  is much  less  prevalent  during  this
time  period  which  suggests  the  extent  of fed  cattle  market  boundaries  was  small.  The
absence  of causality  suggests  meat-packers  treated  pricing  within  regional  markets  as
independent  decisions.  Interestingly,  the  economic  market  boundaries  appear  to  be the
smallest when smallest amount of multiple-market  market power is being exercised. This
is the time  when exercise  of market power would be  most profitable.
It is interesting  to compare  the results  of this  study with results  of some of the other
market power  studies of beef-packing  and with results  of the  single-market  model.  The
conclusions  here are consistent  with  other research.  This work  adds  to the  growing list
of New Empirical Industrial  Organization  (NEIO) research which has  found evidence of
market  power exercised  by beef-packers.  While  a variety  of empirical models  and  data
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have been employed,  the results  consistently reveal  evidence  of market power exercised
in  fed  cattle  markets  (Azzam  and  Anderson).  However,  the  magnitude  of the  market
power  is  small,  usually  1-3%  of average  price and  occasionally  larger or not  present.
The  NEIO  studies'  estimates  are  larger  than those  of recent  studies  using  transaction
price data  (Texas Agricultural Market Research  Center)  which follow  the structure-con-
duct-performance  approach.  Concentration  effects  in the  transaction  data  are less  than
1%.  The losses found  in  Koontz, Garcia,  and  Hudson (1993)  are consistent  with the  1-
3%  figures. 9 Further,  the  single-market  model  results  are  consistent  with  the  increased
use  of market power in regions with common firms.  The uniqueness  of the work here  is
that this  is the first evidence  of multiple-market  conduct in regional  fed cattle markets.10
The  results  here  are  also  consistent  with  the  price  dynamics  studies.  Goodwin  and
Schroeder  (1991)  and Hayenga, Koontz, and Schroeder (Part 3) make similar conclusions
about which regions lead price discovery. The advantage of this work, unlike the dynamic
multipliers from time-series  models, is the direct link between the measurements of price
behavior  and the implied  noncompetitive  conduct.
Conclusions
A noncooperative game-theoretic  model of meat-packer pricing conduct across geograph-
ic markets  is developed.  The economic  model suggests exercise  of market power results
in a specific type of price behavior. We test for and find this price behavior in geographic
fed cattle markets during a time period encompassing May  1980 to September  1982 and
separately  for the time period July  1984 to July  1986.  The geographic  fed cattle markets
examined include  the major  direct  and terminal markets in  the Upper Midwest, Central,
and  Southern Plains  states.
The economic model  suggests  that exercise  of market power in  purchasing  fed cattle
requires  meat-packers  to follow a two-phase  pricing strategy:  low prices are paid during
cooperative  phases  and  high prices  are paid  during  noncooperative  phases  (relative  to
boxed  beef).  This  strategy  can be extended  to  a multiple-market  setting:  low prices  are
paid  in  all  relevant  markets  during  cooperative  phases  and  high  prices  are paid  in  all
relevant markets during noncooperative  phases.  Meat-packer profits are enhanced during
cooperative phases above the more competitive levels experienced  during noncooperative
phases.
The discontinuous pattern  is found in the behavior of fed cattle prices for each of the
regions examined and the discontinuous patterns are not independent across regions. This
implies  the  exercise  of market  power  is  coordinated  across  regional  markets.  There  is
evidence  that  the  Upper  Midwest  markets  (Illinois;  Iowa;  Eastern  Nebraska;  Omaha,
Nebraska;  and  Sioux  City,  Iowa),  the  Central  Plains  markets  (Western  Nebraska  and
Colorado),  and the Southern Plains markets (Eastern Kansas, Western Kansas,  and Texas)
each  constitutes  an  economic  market.  However,  Colorado  and  Texas  are  largely  inde-
pendent.  There is also evidence  that the more meat-packers  that are common within two
9  However,  the results  here  are based  on  models  of daily  margin  changes  for eight  regions  while previous  research  has
used annual  or quarterly  data for the entire  U.S. Azzam  and Schroeter is the  one other  study that  examined  direct impacts
of market power on  regional  prices,  using  data for  13 regions.
10  Schroeter and Azzam  examine,  but do not find, multiple-market  conduct between  beef-  and pork-packing  industries.
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geographic  regions,  the more market power that is exercised.  However, the overall mag-
nitude of the multiple-market  market power is  small particularly in  the  second period.
Several  general implications  can be drawn from this research. First, coordination  pric-
ing  strategies  across  markets  suggest  that  market power  has  been exercised  across  fed
cattle markets.  Second, the magnitude of our results indicates that losses imposed by the
less than competitive structure  are relatively  small. Third, our findings indicate that mar-
ket power is  not constant over  time nor uniform  over space.  Meat-packers  operate  in a
dynamic  environment  in  which  they  adjust pricing  strategies  to  varying  market condi-
tions.  The strongest exercise  of market  power was  found from May  1980  to  September
1982.  Maintaining  cooperative  strategies  during  the  mid-1980s  may  have  been  more
difficult  because  of supply  conditions.  Nevertheless,  between  July  1984  and  July  1985,
there  is evidence of coordinated pricing. Changing conduct across markets and over time
highlights  the difficulty  and importance of continued monitoring for competitive perfor-
mance. Changing  conduct  also  suggests  the  importance of developing  a more  compre-
hensive understanding  of the factors  influencing conduct  and competition.
[Received August 1995; final version received November 1996.]
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